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I. ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter comes before the Court on an appeal from the District Court's entry of summary 
judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Cross Respondent Hap Taylor & Sons, Inc. d/b/a Knife River ("Knife 
River") to foreclose its mechanics' liens against certain real property located in Canyon County. 
The Distlict Court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of Knife River should be 
affirmed on appeal, and Knife River should be permitted to proceed with the sale of the subject 
property under the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure issued on October 26,2012 ("Judgment"). 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case evolves from a failed real estate development project that began in 2006, and 
subsequently ended in foreclosure. Following a series of defaults by the developer, numerous 
mechanics' liens were recorded against the project, including the liens of Knife River and Stanley 
Consultants, Inc. ("Stanley Consultants"). 
The project at issue was an ambitious multi-use development, which included approximately 
91 residential building lots with a golf course incorporated into the two phases of the subdivision. 
The developer contracted for the commencement of the work in the summer of 2006, several 
months before even completing and recording the plats for the development. Over a year after 
construction on the project began, the developer obtained financing from Integrated Financial 
Associates, Inc. ("IF A") in the amount of $9,500,000.00 for the completion of the project. Shortly 
after receiving the loan proceeds from IF A, the developer defaulted on its obligations to multiple 
parties, which led to the foreclosure of the property by various lien claimants and IF A. The only 
remall1l11g mechanics' lien claimants 111 these consolidated cases are Knife River and Stanley 
Consultants. 
The issues presented in the appeal by IF A relate to the validity and priority of Knife River's 
liens against the development property. IF A asserts that the District Court erroneously determined 
that Knife River performed all of its work under a single contract with the general contractor, 
Extreme Line Logistics, Inc. ("ELL"), or, alternatively, that Knife River improperly tacked its lien 
rights to two separate contracts between ELL and the developer. IF A further contends the District 
Court erred in its determination that Idaho Code Section 45-508 did not apply to Knife River's liens. 
Finally, IF A appeals the District Court's Judgment on the grounds that it does not comply with 
Idaho Code Section 45-505. 
The District Court's orders and Judgment in this case are fully supported by the undisputed 
facts presented in the record and Idaho law governing the foreclosure of mechanics' liens, and 
should, therefore, be affirmed. 
B. Proceedings Before the District Court. 
Knife River agrees with Stanley Consultants' description of the proceedings before the 
District Court and its disposition. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
In June 2006, Knife River and ELL entered into a subcontract agreement for Knife River to 
provide all materials, equipment and labor to place and compact asphalt throughout the entire 
Summerwind at Orchard Hills Subdivision ("Summerwind Development"). R. Vol. III, p. 331, ~ 9; 
R. Vol. II, p. 320, ~'[ 10-11. Knife River performed its paving work in the Summerwind 
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Development under the terms and conditions of its written unit price proposal accepted and signed 
by ELL on or about June 26, 2006 ("Proposal"). R. Vol. III, p. 336. 
The Summerwind Development included a residential subdivision and golf course divided 
and platted into two phases. R. Vol. III, pp. 420-428 and 432-441. 1 Knife River's scope of work 
under the terms of its agreement with ELL was to perform all asphalt paving for the entire 
Summerwind Development, which included roadways, approaches, culverts for highway district 
rights of way, access and tie-ins to the pump house, golf cart paths and the parking lot for the 
clubhouse. R. Vol. VI, p. 1036 (Daniels Depo., p. 118, I. 8-10); R. Vol. VI, p. 1012 (Daniels Depo., 
p. 24, II. 11-21). Knife River's Proposal contained an escalation clause that allowed Knife River to 
increase the unit price for asphalt in the event the cost of liquid cement rose above the specified 
amount of $400.00 per ton. R. Vol. III, p. 336. 
At the time ELL was approached by the construction manager for the Summerwind 
Development in the summer of 2006, ELL understood that it would be performing site work for 
both the residential subdivision and the golf course. R. Vol. VI, p. 1012 (Daniels Depo., p. 22, 
1. 10 - p. 24, 1. 24). From the outset, ELL considered the Summerwind Development to be one 
large, integrated development project that included residential building lots and a golf course. Id 
Likewise, ELL also considered the roadway and golf cart path paving as one project. R. Vol. VI, p. 
1017 (Daniels Depo., p. 44, II. 3-5). 
I The recorded plats for Phases I and II of the Summerwind Development reference the common lots and 
easements for the golf course in the Notes section, e.g. R. Vol. III, p. 420, and R. Vol. III, p. 432. 
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The plats for Phases I and II of the Summerwind Development were not recorded until 
Febmary 2, 2007. R. Vol. III, pp. 420-428; R. Vol. III, pp. 432-441. The recorded plats depict the 
locations for both the residential building lots and the golf course. ld. The only access to the golf 
course lots is over the dedicated roadways depicted on the recorded plats. ld. By the time the plats 
were recorded in February 2007, a substantial amount of work had already been perfonned in the 
Summerwind Development by Knife River under its contract with ELL. R. Vol. III, pp. 383-410. 
The recorded plats for Phases I and II of the Summerwind Development include an 
acknowledgement by Golden Gate Highway District No.3 accepting the dedication of the roadways 
depicted in the plats for both phases. R. Vol. III, pp. 427 and 440. 
When ELL solicited a bid from Knife River in June 2006 to provide asphalt paving for the 
Summerwind Development, ELL intended to utilize Knife River as the paving subcontractor for all 
oftheSurnmerwindDevelopment. R. Vol. VI,p.1035 (Daniels Depo.,p. 11311.17-23). Priorto 
submitting its Proposal, Knife River was infonned by ELL that the Surnmerwind Development 
included a residential subdivision and golf course, both of which would require asphalt paving. 
R. Vol. VI, p. 1022 (Daniels Depo., p. 63, II. 3-24). Knife River understood and intended for its 
Proposal to cover all of the asphalt paving requested by ELL for the Surnrnerwind Development. 
R. Vol. III, p. 331,,12; R. Vol. VII, pp. 1091-93,'~ 5, 9,11 and 14. 
Knife River mobilized and commenced work on the project on August 22, 2006. R. Vol. 
III, p. 332, ,r 14. Knife River began by first paving sections of the dedicated roadways in the 
residential portions of the Summerwind Development in November 2006. R. Vol. III, pp. 383-402. 
In April 2007, Knife River returned to the Summerwind Development to pave more of the 
4 
residential roadways. R. Vol. III, pp. 357-382. In July 2007, Knife River performed additional 
paving of the residential roadways. R. Vol. III, pp. 355-356. In August 2007, Knife River began 
paving the golf cart paths. R. Vol. III, p. 340-354. Knife River did not complete either the 
roadways or the golf cart paths when it pulled off the project in August 2007. R. Vol. VI, p. 1022 
(Daniels Depo., p. 61, 11. 16-22); R. Vol. VI, p. 10 11 (Daniels Depo., p. 20, 11. 2-14). Knife River 
also did not complete paving the areas around the pump house or the golf course parking lot. R. 
Vol. VI, pp. 1011-12 (Daniels Depo., p. 20, 1. 19 p. 21, 1. 14). The last date Knife River 
performed any work in the Summerwind Development was August 29, 2007. R. Vol. Ill, p. 332, 
,r 16; R. Vol. III, p. 340. 
Knife River only had crews onsite at the Summerwind Development during the times ELL 
directed Knife Riverto pave portions of the project. R. Vol. VI, pp. 10 14-1 0 15 (Daniels Depo., 
p. 32,1. 11 p. 33, 1. 7); R. Vol. III, pp. 340-410. ELL would perform and complete the preparation 
of the site prior to scheduling asphalt paving with Knife River. R. Vol. VI, pp. 1114-1115 (Daniels 
Depo., p. 32, 1. 11 p. 33, 1. 7). 
In August 2007, ELL contacted Knife River to schedule additional pavmg m the 
Summerwind Development, including the golf cart paths. R. Vol. VII, p. 1 092, ~ 10. ELL also 
requested a price from Knife River for use of Knife River's paver to place the 31t H base material for 
the golf cart paths. Jd. Knife River quoted ELL a price of $2.60 per ton for use of Knife River's 
paver. Jd.; R. Vol. VII, p. 1124. During this time, Knife River informed ELL that the price of 
asphalt oil increased above $400.00 per ton, so the unit price for asphalt paving under the tenns of 
the escalation clause in the Proposal for the Summerwind Development would be $65.40 per ton. 
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R. Vol. VII, p. 1093, ~~ 15 and 16. Knife River documented the increased unit price for paving the 
golf cart paths and the agreed cost for use of Knife River's paver in a Small Job Worksheet. R. Vol. 
VII, p. 1 092, ~~ 8 and 10; R. Vol. VII, p. 1124. Knife River utilized the Small Job Worksheet to 
track the increased price for future paving in the Sununerwind Development and the cost to bill 
ELL for use of the paver. Jd The Small Job Worksheet specifically states "Bill Proposal." R. Vol. 
VII, p. 1124. Knife River proceeded to invoice ELL for paving the golf cart paths under the terms 
of the accepted Proposal. R. Vol. VII, pp. 1092-1093, 'r~ 11 and 14. The paving work performed 
by Knife River in August 2007 included paving approaches and paving over culverts in the 
roadways, in addition to paving sections of the golf cart paths. R. Vol. III, p. 340; R. Vol. VI, p. 
1012 (Daniels Depo., p. 24,11. 11-21). 
Knife River discontinued any further work in the Summerwind Development due to non-
payment by ELL for the asphalt paving completed through August 29, 2007. R. Vol. III, p. 332, 
~~ 16 and 18. At the time Knife River removed its equipment and personnel from the Surnmerwind 
Development project, Knife River was owed the principal sum of $217,385.82. R. Vol. VII, 
pp. 1153-1155. On October 25, 2007, Knife River recorded liens against Phases I and II of the 
Summerwind Development to secure the unpaid amounts due and owing for work Knife River 
performed on the project. R. Vol. III, pp. 417-441. On October 26, 2007, Knife River sent copies 
of the recorded liens by certified mail to the owners of the Summerwind Development and their 
registered agents. R. Vol. III, pp. 443-454. 
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Approximately nine (9) mechanics' liens were recorded against all or some portion of the 
Summerwind Development between October 25,2007 and February 26, 2008, including the liens of 
Knife River, Stanley Consultants and ELL. R. Vol. I, pp. 62-65. 
IF A initially recorded a mortgage against the Summerwind Development on 
December 22,2006. R. Vol. I, p. 48. IFA subsequently released its mortgage, and recorded Deeds 
of Trust against the Summerwind Development on July 13, 2007. R. Vol. I, pp. 49-61. IFA 
proceeded to record a series of partial assignments of its Deeds of Trust to various parties later in 
2007. ld IFA and the assignees to the IFA Deeds of Trust later fonned an entity named 
Summerwind Partners, LLC ("Summerwind Partners"), and IF A is the managing member of the 
company. R. Vol. VII, p. 1196. IF A foreclosed its Deeds of Trust against the Summerwind 
Development on January 29, 2009 and March 17, 2009. R. Vol. VIII, p. 1391. Summerwind 
Partners obtained title to the Summerwind Development property by way of a series of Trustee's 
Deeds. R. Vol. VII, pp. 1177-1188. As of November 30,2010, the Canyon County Tax Assessor's 
Office had issued Tax Deeds for nineteen (19) of the residential building lots in the Summerwind 
Development for non-payment of property taxes by Summerwind Partners. R. Vol. VII, pp. 1198-
1216. 
Summerwind Partners conveyed title to the golf course lots within the Summerwind 
Development to Idaho Golf Partners ("IGP") by way of a Special Warranty Deed recorded on 
February 15, 2011. R. Vol. IX, pp. 1458-1464. The Special Warranty Deed specifically provides 
that Fidelity National Title shall insure around the liens of both Knife River and Stanley 
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Consultants. Id IGP operates a public golf course on these lots named Timber Stone Golf Course. 
Id 
In March 2011, IF A filed for bankruptcy relief in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
Distlict of Nevada, Case No. 11-l3537. R. Vol. IX, p. 1453, ~ 5. On or about August 3, 2012, 
Knife River lodged with the District Court an order lifting the stay in the IF A bankruptcy to allow 
Knife River to proceed with its foreclosure of the Summerwind Development. Augmentation 
Record, August 3,2012 Notice of Lodging of Order Granting Bankruptcy Stay Relief. On or about 
August 16, 2012, Summerwind Partners filed for bankruptcy relief in the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the District of Nevada, Case No. 12-19536. R. Vol. IX, p. 1495, ~ 4. On or about 
October 26, 2012, the District Court entered the ludgment and Decree of Foreclosure providing for 
the sale of the golf course lots within the Surnmerwind Development that are not subject to the 
automatic stay in either the Surnmerwind Partners bankruptcy or the IF A bankruptcy. R. Vol. IX, 
pp.1543-155l. 
II. COSTS ON APPEAL 
Knife River hereby requests an award of its costs on appeal, pursuant to Idaho Appellate 
Rule 40 and Idaho Code Section 12-101. 
III. ARGUMENT 
IFA's appeal is premised on a narrow, restrictive application of Idaho's lien statutes, 
disregarding the liberal construction required by law to be given in favor of Knife River as the lien 
claimant. IFA also disregards the overwhelming, undisputed facts which support the District 
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Court's decisions. For the reasons set forth below, the Court should affirm the District COUl1's 
Judgment and orders. 
A. Standard of review. 
IFA has appealed from the District Court's ruling in favor of Knife River in two different 
summary judgment orders. None of the parties in this case requested a jury trial. 
Slll1unary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P.56(c). 
"When an action will be tried before the court without a jury, the trial court as the trier of 
fact is entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences based upon the undisputed evidence 
properly before it and grant the summary judgment despite the possibility of conflicting inferences." 
Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C, 140 Idaho 354, 360-361, 93 P.3d 685, 691-692 (2004). 
The trial judge is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted 
evidentiary facts. Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P .2d 1272 (1991); Riverside Dev. 
Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 650 P.2d 657 (1982) (allowing the trial judge in non-jury cases to 
grant summary judgment on undisputed evidentiary facts, despite conflicting inferences, because 
the court alone will be responsible for choosing those inferences). The test for the appellate court 
reviewing the inferences drawn by the trial court is whether the record reasonably supports such 
inferences. Shawver, 140 Idaho at 361. 
A motion for summary judgment is to be decided upon the facts shown, not upon facts 
which might have been shown. Barton v. Cannon, 94 Idaho 422, 489 P.2d 1021 (1971); Verbillis v. 
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Dependable Appliance Co., 107 Idaho 335, 689 P.2d 1075 (CL App. 1984). The moving party is 
entitled to swnmary judgment when the non-moving party fails to make a showing sufTIcient to 
establish the existence of an element essential to that pmiy's case on which that party will bear the 
burden of proof at trial. Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101,765 P.2d 126 (1988). The non-moving 
party may not rest on a mere scintilla of evidence. ParkWest Homes, LLC v. Barnson, 154 Idaho 
678,302 P.3d 18 (2013). 
This Court exercises "free review over matters of statutory interpretation." Ferrell v. United 
Financial Cas. Co., 155 Idaho 85, 88, 305 P.3d 529, 532 (2013); farmers Nat 'I Bank v. Green 
River Dairy, LLC, No. 40101, 2014 WL 268643 (Idaho Jan. 24, 2014). "The interpretation of a 
statute 'must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, 
and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, 
this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written. '" Verska v. St. Alphonsus 
Reg'!. Med. Cntr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011). 
B. The District Court rightfully found that Knife River's interests in the Summerwind 
Development property are superior to IFA. 
Under Idaho law, every person or company providing labor, materials or professional 
services for the construction of improvements to real property has a lien against the real property for 
the cost of said labor, services or materials. The right to assert a lien against real property for 
providing construction services or materials originates in the Idaho State Constitution, which 
provides in pertinent part: "The legislature shall provide by proper legislation for giving to 
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mechanics, laborers, and materialmen an adequate lien on the subject matter of their labor." Idaho 
Const. Ali. VIII, § 6. 
Idaho's lien statutes are liberally construed to effectuate their object and promote justice. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, 94 Idaho 489, 493, 491 P.2d 1261, 1265 
(1971). The goal of Idaho's lien statutes is to compensate those that have perfom1ed work in the 
construction, alteration or repair of a structure or real property. Barber v. Honorof, 116 Idaho 767, 
768-69, 780 P.2d 89, 90-91 (1989). A mechanics' lien "is not provided as a penalty, but rather as 
security." Guyman v. Anderson, 75 Idaho 294, 295, 271 P.2d 1020, 1021 (1954). A lien claimant 
needs to only substantially comply with the statutory requirements in order to create a valid lien. 
Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. v. Sumpter, 139 Idaho 846, 850, 87 P.3d 955,959 (2004). 
Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 45-506, a mechanic's lien claim is "preferred to any lien, 
mortgage or other encumbrance which may have attached subsequent to the time when the building, 
improvement or structure was commenced, work done, equipment, materials or fixtures were rented 
or leased, or materials or professional services were commenced to be furnished." "The effective 
date of labor and materialmen's liens is the date of the commencement of the work or improvement 
or the commencing to fumish material." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 94 Idaho at 492. 
The longstanding rule in Idaho is that "[a]ll liens for labor commenced and materials 
commenced to be furnished prior to recording [the] mortgages are prior and superior liens to said 
mortgages." Pacific States Savings, Loan & Building Co. v. Dubois, 11 Idaho 319, 320, 83 P. 513, 
514 (1905); see also, Ultrawall, Inc. v. Washington Mutual Bank, 135 Idaho 832, 25 P.3d 855 
(2001). 
1 1 
The preferred status of lien claimants established by Idaho Code Section 45-506 
demonstrates the legislature'S intent favoring a mechanics' lien claimant over a party secured by a 
mortgage or deed of trust. 
IF A recorded its Deed of Trust against the Summerwind Development on July 13, 2007, 
thus its interest in the property attached on that date. Idaho Code § 55-811. Knife River 
commenced work at the Sumerwind Development on August 22, 2006, well in advance of the date 
IF A recorded its Deed of Trust. Based upon the plain language of Idaho Code Section 45-506 and 
the cases construing the priority of a mechanics' lien relative to a deed of trust, Knife River's 
interest in the Summerwind Development is, therefore, senior and superior to that of IF A. 
The District Court properly found that Knife River is entitled to summary judgment to 
establish the validity and priority of its lien rights. In reaching its decision, the District Court 
liberally applied Idaho's lien statutes to effectuate the purpose of protecting Knife River's rights as a 
mechanics' lien claimant. R. Vol. VI, pp. 990-992. 
IFA and IGP seek a strict, nalTOW construction ofIdaho Code Sections 45-501, 45-505, 45-
506 and 45-508 in an effort to subordinate or impair Knife River's liens in direct contravention of 
Idaho case law construing the purposes and application of these statutes. 
In order to effectuate the purposes of Idaho's lien statutes, the Court should not adopt the 
restrictive application of Idaho Code Section 45-508 presented by IFA and IGP to subordinate or 
otherwise impair Knife River's rights. There is no question that the current owners of the subject 
property, Summerwind Partners and IGP, have utilized and enjoyed the benefits of Knife River's 
paving improvement to the Summerwind Development, while Knife River has been prosecuting its 
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rights for close to six (6) years to enforce its liens. The District Court's decisions and orders finding 
that Knife River has a valid, enforceable right to foreclose its liens are consistent with well-
established Idaho law, and should be affirmed on appeal. 
C. The District Court properly found that Knife River performed all of its work to 
improve the Summerwind Development under a single contract with ELL. 
There is no evidence in the record to support the assertion by IF A and IGP that Knife River 
had multiple contracts with ELL for the work Knife River performed in the Summerwind 
Development. To the contrary, the overwhelming evidence in the record supports the District 
Court's finding that Knife River and ELL entered into a single unit price contract whereby Knife 
River would provide all materials, labor and equipment necessary for the placement and compaction 
of asphalt throughout the entire Summerwind Development. 
The extent of a mechanic's lien is measured by the amount due the lien claimant on his 
contract at the time of the filing of his lien. Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. v. Sumpter, 139 Idaho 846, 
852,87 P.3d 955,961 (2004) quoting Steltz v. Armory Co., 15 Idaho 551,558,99 P. 98, 101 (1908). 
"The interpretation of a contract's meaning and legal effect are questions of law to be decided by 
the Court if the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous." Electrical Supply Wholesale Co., 
Inc. v. Nielson, 136 Idaho 814, 822,41 P.3d 242, 251 (2001). 
Under the terms of the parties' single unit price contract, Knife River was only entitled to 
payment for the actual tons of asphalt placed and compacted in the Summerwind Development for 
the agreed upon unit price. Haener v. Ada County Highway Dist., 108 Idaho 170, 697 P.2d 1184 
(1985); see also, Waltech Construction Corp. v. Town of Thompson, 237 A.D.2d 716, 717, 654 
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N. Y.S.2d 456, 457 (3d Dept. 1997) (Unit price contracts "entitle the contractor to payment for work 
completed, at the agreed upon unit price, even in circumstances in which the amount of work is 
considerably in excess of the estimates"). 
There is no disagreement between Knife River and ELL as to the scope or enforceability of 
their contract. Both parties understood Knife River would provide all asphalt paving to the 
Summerwind Development whether the asphalt amounted to 1,000 tons or 8,000 tons, and the 
accepted Proposal specifically provides for the unit price Knife River would charge for its work. 
R. Vol. VI, p. 1022 (Daniels Depo., p. 63,11. 3-10); R. Vol. VII, p. 1091-92, ~ 5; R. Vol. VII, p. 
1122. IF A's interpretation of Knife River and ELL's contract is irrelevant, particularly in light of 
the fact that neither Knife River nor ELL disputes its meaning.2 
ELL notified Knife River when it requested a bid for the price of asphalt in June 2006 that 
the Summerwind Development included paving for both dedicated roadways and golf cart paths. 
R. Vol. VI, p. 1022 (Daniels Depo., p. 63, 11. 3-10). Knife River and ELL both intended for Knife 
River's written Proposal to include the unit price for all asphalt paving, whether the paving was for 
roadways, the pump house, the approaches or the golf cart paths. Id; R. Vol. VII, pp. 1091-1093, 
~~ 5,10,11 and 14. 
The conduct of the parties after the Proposal was accepted and executed is perfectly 
consistent with Knife River's asseliion that all of the work it performed 111 the Summerwind 
2 IF A erroneously states in its Brief that "ELL did not intend to subcontract the asphalt work for the cart 
paths." Brief, p. 5. IFA relies on a portion of the deposition transcript of Casey Daniels to support this statement. 
Mr. Daniels was testifying about the placement of J;''' base material, not paving. Mr. Daniels testified that ELL did 
not perform asphalt paving work. R. Vol. VI, p. 1013 (Daniels Dep., p. 25, II. 9-20); R. Vol. VI, p. 1019 (Daniels 
Depo., p. 19, II. 19-23). 
14 
Development was done under a single contract with ELL. When Knife River exercised its right to 
escalate the unit price per ton for asphalt due to increases in the cost of liquid cement in the summer 
of 2007, it informed ELL while also documenting the increased unit price in an internal Small Job 
Worksheet. R. Vol. VII, p. 1092, ~ 10; R. Vol. VII, p. 1124. In addition, ELL requested pricing 
from Knife River for the use of Knife River's paver to place the ~" base material for the golf cart 
paths, which is also documented in Knife River's Small Job Worksheet. Id. Knife River's use of a 
Small Job Worksheet for internal documentation of costs did not create a separate contract with 
ELL for the Summerwind Development. To the contrary, the Small Job Worksheet explicitly states 
"Bill Proposal" in reference to the Proposal accepted and signed by ELL. R. Vol. VII, p. 1124. 
In addition to the documentation evidencing the single contract between Knife River and 
ELL for the Summerwind Development, the testimony of representatives from both companies 
further supports the District Court's finding that Knife River performed all of its work under one 
contract. Knife River's Project Manager testified in his affidavit that all of the asphalt work 
performed by Knife River in the Summerwind Development was done pursuant to the terms of the 
signed Proposal. R. Vol. VII, pp. 1091-1093, ~'r 5, 10, 11 and 14. Likewise, the President of ELL 
consistently testified in both his affidavit and deposition that ELL had a single contract with Knife 
River for the placement and compaction of all of the asphalt in the Summerwind Development. 
R. Vol. II, p. 320-321, ~~ 9-13; R. Vol VI, p. 1022 (Daniels Depo., p. 63, II. 3-23). 
Since Knife River furnished all of the materials and labor to improve the Summerwind 
Development under one contract with ELL, Knife River is entitled to a priority date on its 
mechanics' liens at the time it first commenced work in August 2006. Ultrawall, Inc. v. 
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Washington Mutual Bank, FSB, 135 Idaho 832, 835, 25 P.3d 855,858 (2001). Furthem10re, Knife 
River's liens were timely recorded within ninety (90) days from the last date it perfol111ed work in 
the Summerwind Development pursuant to its contract with ELL. Valley Lumber & lvlfg. Co. v. 
Driessel, 13 Idaho 662, 665, 93 P. 765, 768 (1907); Franklin Bldg. Supply Co., 139 Idaho at 852. 
The District Court's decisions in both its initial order granting summary judgment in favor 
of Knife River and in the order denying IF A's first motion for reconsideration are fully supported 
by the record. IF A failed to present any evidence to advance its assertion that Knife River and ELL 
had separate agreements for the paving work perfol111ed by Knife River in the Summerwind 
Development. Consequently, Knife River was entitled to summary judgment against IF A with 
regard to the scope of Knife River's contract and the validity and priority of Knife River's lien 
rights. 
The District Court properly considered all of the evidence presented to it, and detel111ined 
that there was only one contract between Knife River and ELL for the infrastructure paving 
improvement perfol111ed by Knife River. Based on the Rule 56 standard for summary judgment, the 
District Court's order granting Knife River's initial motion for summary judgment and later denying 
IF A's first motion for reconsideration are both supported by the record, and should not be disturbed 
on appeal. 
D. IFA failed to present any evidence to prove that Knife River had actual or 
constructive knowledge of the contractual relationship between ELL and the 
developer. 
The record in this matter is void of any evidence that Knife River had knowledge of the 
contracts entered into between ELL and the developer for work perfol111ed in the Summerwind 
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Development. In order to support its argument that Knife River is attempting to tack its lien to the 
two separate contracts entered into between ELL and the developer, IF A carries the burden of proof 
to present evidence that Knife River either knew or should have known the scope of ELL's 
contracts for work performed in the Sumrnerwind Development. IF A failed to present any such 
evidence to the District Court or raise any genuine issue of material fact to refute the affidavit and 
deposition testimony supporting the District Court's order. 
In Gem State Lumber Co. v. School Dist. No.8, in Caribou County, 44 Idaho 359, 256 P. 
949,950 (1927), the Court held: 
The rule may generally be stated that where a defendant seeks to 
defeat plaintiff s right to recover in an action to foreclose a 
mechanic's lien by showing that the material was furnished on two 
separate and distinct contracts, and that the lien was not filed in time 
to secure the claim for the material furnished on the first contract, the 
burden of proof is on the defendant to show either that the plaintiff 
had actual knowledge that the material was furnished and used on 
two separate contracts, or else show such circumstances as would 
impute to the plaintiff constructive notice and put him on his inquiry 
to ascertain that two or more contracts did in fact exist. 
"Where materials are furnished for the same building or improvement m installments and at 
intervals, and the parties intend them to be included in one account and settlement, the entire 
account will be treated as a continuous and connected transaction, and the lien limitation begins to 
run from the last item of the account." Valley Lumber & MIg. CO. v. Driessei, 13 Idaho 662, 665, 
93 P. 765, 768 (1907). The party seeking to defeat the enforceability of the claimant's lien must 
present positive testimony in the record showing that the claimant had information of separate 
contracts for the work performed. Id. at 664. 
17 
All of the facts and evidence in this case demonstrate that Knife River performed its work 
for ELL in the Smnmerwind Development under the tenns of the accepted Proposal. Furthennore, 
IF A failed to meet its burden by presenting any positive testimony or other evidence that Knife 
River had actual knowledge of the contracts entered into between ELL and the developer for the 
work ELL perfonned. 
Both IF A and lOP assert that the roadways were completed by Knife River some 113 days 
before Knife River began paving the golf cart paths in the summer of 2007. This assertion is 
directly and clearly refuted by the evidence in the record. Casey Daniels consistently testified that 
none of the Surnmerwind Development project was completed in 2007, induding the roadways and 
the golf course. R. Vol. VI, p. 1011 (Daniels Depo., p. 20,11.9-14); R. Vol. VI, p. 1022 (Daniels 
Depo., p. 61, 11. 16-22); R. Vol. VI, pp. 1011-1012 (Daniels Depo., p. 20, 1. 19 - p. 21, 1. 14). 
Furthennore, some of the paving work perfonned by Knife River in late August 2007 was for 
approaches and culverts, which are part of the roadways for the highway district, not the golf cart 
paths. Casey Daniels testified in his deposition that part of ELL's scope of work included "putting 
in culverts for the highway district right of ways." R. Vol. VI, p. 1012 (Daniels Depo., p. 24, 11. 20-
21). The Knife River Superintendent Daily Report describing work perfonned on August 29, 2007 
includes a reference to paving "three approaches with culverts." R. Vol. III, p. 340. Thus, Knife 
River was working on both the roadways and cart paths under its contract with ELL only fifty-seven 
(57) days prior to recording its liens. The arguments by IFA and lOP that Knife River completed 
the roadways in April 2007 is directly contradicted by the evidence in the record. 
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IFA's attempt to provide this Court with the series of "inquiries" IFA believes Knife River 
was required to undertake as a matter oflaw is misguided and wholly ignores the nature of the work 
Knife River performed in the Surnmerwind Development. Mr. Daniels testified in his deposition 
that he informed Knife River in June 2006 that the paving for the Summerwind Development would 
include golf cart paths (R. Vol. VI, p. 1022 (Daniels Depo., p. 63, 1. 3 - p. 64, 1. 17)), so there would 
be no reason for Knife River to inquire of ELL whether ELL had a separate contract with the 
developer for paving the golf cart paths in August 2007. Mr. Daniels also testified that he only 
directed Knife River to be onsite when the project was prepped and ready for paving. R. Vol. VI, 
pp. 1014-1015 (Daniels Depo., p. 32, 1. 11 p. 33, 1. 7). Consequently, Knife River was only 
present at the Summerwind Development for a limited number of days in August 2006, November 
2006, April 2007, June 2007 and August 2007 to perform its paving work. R. Vol. III, pp. 340-
410.3 In light of the limited and sporadic periods of time Knife River was actually present at the 
Summerwind Development to perform its work, there would be no reason for Knife River to inquire 
as to the contractual relationship between ELL and the developer. Based on the manner in which 
the construction of the Summerwind Development was occurring throughout 2006 and 2007, the 
passage of a few months between the times Knife River was directed to pave the project by ELL is 
insufficient to put Knife River on inquiry notice of ELL potentially having two separate contracts 
with the developer, particularly since no aspect of the paving was actually completed. R. Vol. VI, p. 
1011 (Daniels Depo., p. 20, ll. 2-12); R. Vol. VI, p. 1012 (Daniels Depo., p. 21, II. 3-14). 
3 Based on the days described in Knife River's project file reports, Knife River was onsite from August 22, 
2006 to August 29, 2007 for a total of approximately sixteen (16) days for the performance of its infrastructure 
paving work. 
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In the event the Court finds facts existed to put Knife River on inquiry notice with regard to 
ELL's contractual relationship with the developer, the issue is a question of fact to be detennined by 
the District Court on remand. Bailey v. Ewing, lOS Idaho 636, 641, 671 P.2d 1099,1014 (Cl. App. 
1983). IF A, therefore, would not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this issue, especially 
since IF A relies on alleged facts relating to the completion of the roadways which is directly refuted 
by the testimony of Casey Daniels and Knife River's construction records. 
The District Court wldertook an extensive analysis of the evidence IF A presented to support 
IFA's contention that Knife River either knew or should have known that ELL had entered into 
separate contracts with the developer for work perfonned on the project, and properly concluded 
IFA failed to meet its burden. R. VoL VI, pp. 986-987; Augmentation Record, October 26,2010 
Order on Defendant IF A's Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 9-28. After considering the evidence in 
the record, the District Court relied on the undisputed facts and the only reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from those facts to support its orders. IF A has not presented any facts or authorities to 
warrant a reversal of the District Court's ruling on this issue. 
E. The District Court correctly determined that Idaho Code Section 45-508 docs not 
apply to Knife River's liens. 
Idaho Code Section 4S-S01 provides in pertinent part: 
Every person perfonning labor upon, or furnishing materials to be 
used in the construction, alteration or repair of any mining claim, 
building ... or any other structure, or who grades, fills in, levels, 
surfaces or otherwise improves any land ... has a lien upon the 
same for the work or labor done ... or materials furnished. 
Idaho Code Section 4S-S01 provides for two different types of liens "differentiated between 
improvements made on the land, such as buildings and structures, and work done to improve the 
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land itself, such as grading, filling in, and leveling." Hopkins Northwest Fund, LLC v. Landscapes 
Unlimited, LLC, 151 Idaho 740, 744, 264 P.3d 379, 383 (2011). The first type of lien applies to 
distinct buildings or other improvements, and only attaches to the underlying land as a "mere 
incident" of the improvement. Id. at 744-45. Conversely, the second type of lien is an actual 
improvement to the land itself, and therefore, provides for a lien against the real property benefitting 
fTom the work. Id 
Idaho Code Section 45-508 provides as follows: 
In every case in which one (1) claim is filed against two (2) or 
more buildings, mines, mining claims, or other improvements, 
owned by the same person, the person filing such claim must, at 
the same time, designate the amount due him on each of said 
buildings, mines, mining claims, or other improvement; otherwise 
the lien of such claim is postponed to other liens. The lien of such 
claim does not extend beyond the amount designated as against 
other creditors having liens by judgment, mortgage, or otherwise, 
upon either of such building, or other improvements, or upon the 
land upon which the same are situated. 
Idaho Code Section 45-508 only applies to the first type of lien, and requires designation of amounts 
due for work performed or materials provided to identifiable buildings, structures or other 
improvements that may be sold to satisfy the lien. Hopkins, 151 Idaho at 745-46. The statute does 
not require claimants who have a lien for improving the land itself to designate amounts due for 
work performed. Id. 
The District Court properly classified Knife River's work to perform asphalt pavmg 
throughout the Surnmerwind Development as an infrastructure improvement to the land. 
Consequently, the District Court ruled that Idaho Code Section 45-508 does not apply, so Knife 
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River was not required to designate amounts due under the statute. R. Vol. VI, pp. 990-992; 
Augmentation Record, December 23, 2011 Order on Defendant IFA's Second Motion for 
Reconsideration and Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 6-13. 
Asphalt paving clearly falls within the second type of lien provided for under Idaho Code 
Section 45-501 because it is part of the overall grading, leveling and surfacing to improve the land 
itself. The Summerwind Development is an integrated project that included a residential 
subdivision and golf course. R. Vol. III, pp. 420-428 and 432-441. The developer was converting 
farm land into marketable residential lots with a golf course amenity benefitting the lot owners. As 
part of this broad project, asphalt paving was required for the dedicated roadways, approaches, 
paving over culverts, pump house, golf cart paths and the golf course parking lot. R. Vol. VI, p. 
1012 (Daniels Depo., p. 24, II. 11-21); R. Vol. VI, p. 1036 (Daniels Depo., p. 118, 11. 8-10). The 
paving itself is by no means a series of independent "improvements" or "structures" under Idaho 
Code Section 45-501 for which the underlying land is only "incidentally" improved by Knife 
River's work. 
IF A argues that the roadways and golf cart paths are separate, distinct "structures" under 
Idaho Code Section 45-501, and should not be classified as improvements to the land.4 In order to 
4 In support of this argument, IF A undertakes a convoluted analysis at p. 21 of its Brief comparing the 
asphalt roadways and golf cart paths constructed by Knife River to railroads and wagon roads in an effort to 
incorporate the definition of the term "construction" in the Idaho Contractor Registration Act, Idaho Code Section 
54-5203(3) into Idaho Code Section 45-501. Knife River respectfully submits that IFA's analysis and comparisons 
are unnecessary in light of the extensive case law construing Idaho's mechanics' lien statutes to determine whether 
work is performed on an identifiable structure or is an improvement to the land itself. Furthermore, the Idaho 
Contractor Registration Act was passed for the express purpose of providing a mechanism to remove incompetent, 
dishonest or unprincipled practitioners from performing construction work in the state of Idaho. The Idaho 
Contractor Registration Act is not related in any manner to the issues raised in this appeal. Finally, Knife River did 
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follow this application of the statute to its logical conclusion, Knife River's lien foreclosure rights 
would be limited to the sale of the actual roadways and the golf cart paths. This argument is flawed 
for several obvious reasons. 
The asphalt paving on the roadways cannot be sold to satisfy Knife River's liens because the 
streets are no longer private property subject to foreclosure. Idaho Code Section 50-1312 provides 
as follows: 
The acknowledgment and recording of such plat is equivalent to a 
deed in fee simple of such portion of the premises platted as is on 
such plat set apart for public streets or other public use, or as is 
thereon dedicated to charitable, religious or educational purposes; 
provided, however, that in a county where a highway district exists 
and is in operation no such plat shall be accepted for recording by 
the county recorder unless the acceptance of said plat by the 
commISSIOners of the highway district is endorsed thereon in 
writing. 
"The language ofLe. § 50-1312 makes clear that the recording of a plat denominating public streets 
transfers an interest equivalent to a fee simple." Volco, Inc. v. Lickley, 126 Idaho 709, 711, 889 
P .2d 1099, 1101 (1995). The roadways depicted in the recorded plats for the Summerwind 
Development are now the property of Golden Gate Highway District No.3. R. Vol. III, pp. 427 and 
440. A claimant cannot enforce its mechanics' lien rights against public property. LaGrand Steel 
Products Co. v. A.SC. Constructors, Inc., 108 Idaho 817, 818, 702 P.2d 855, 856 (1985). 
If the Court were to accept the arguments by IF A and IGP that the roadways should be 
characterized as a separate "structure" capable of foreclosure and sale, Knife River would be left 
not construct a railroad or wagon road in the Summerwind Development as defined in Idaho Code Section 45-501, 
so IF A's argument in this regard is wholly irrelevant. 
23 
with no lien rights at all because the roadways in the Summerwind Development have been 
dedicated to, and accepted by, Golden Gate Highway District No.3. Consequently, the dedicated 
streets paved by Knife River are now public property, and cannot be foreclosed to satisfY Knife 
River's liens. If, however, the asphalt paving of the roadways is classified as an improvement to the 
land, Knife River has the right to foreclose the various lots throughout the Surnmerwind 
Development benefitting from the cost of its improvement. 
With regard to the asphalt paving on the golf course lots, the cart paths are also not separate 
"structures" which can readily be foreclosed and sold to satisfy Knife River's liens. As noted by 
this Court in Hopkins, a golf course is a single, final product comprised of a series of components 
that are essential to the use of the land as a functional golf course. Hopkins, 151 Idaho at 747. Golf 
cart paths are merely one of the various components to the golf course constructed in the 
Summerwind Development, so it is difficult to conceive how Knife River can proceed with a 
foreclosure of the golf cart paths as an identifiable "structure," independent of the other aspects of 
the golf course. The more appropriate characterization of Knife River's work is to classifY the 
asphalt paving as an improvement to the land, thereby allowing Knife River to foreclose the golf 
course lots to satisfY its liens. 
The Summerwind Development is best described as an integrated, multi-use project with 
residential building lots and a private golf course owned by the lot owners. R. Vol. III, pp. 420-428, 
432-441; R. Vol. VI, p. 1012 (Daniels Depo., p. 22, 11. 10-25). From the outset, ELL considered the 
project to be "a subdivision and a golf course as one." R. Vol. VI, p. 10 12 (Daniels Depo., p. 22, 
I. 13). Analogous to the golf course project in Hopkins, the fact that the Summerwind Development 
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included different components requiring asphalt paving should not impair Knife River's right to 
foreclose all of the land benefitting from its improvement. The subdivision and golf course in the 
Summerwind Development are complementary to one another, and should rightfully be deemed 
part of the same broad project. BlvIC West Corp. v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 890, 896, 174 P.3d 399, 405 
(2007). 
Idaho Code Section 45-504 provides as follows: 
Any person who, at the request of the owner of any lot in any 
incorporated city or town, surveys, grades, fills in, or otherwise 
improves the same, or who rents, leases or otherwise supplies 
equipment, materials or fixtures as defined in section 28-12-309, 
Idaho Code, to such person for the improvement of any lot, or the 
street in front of or adjoining the same, has a lien upon such lot for 
his work done or material furnished or equipment, materials or 
fixtures as defined in section 28-12-309, Idaho Code, rented, 
leased or otherwise supplied. 
A lien obtained under Idaho Code Section 45-504 is also not subject to the designation requirements 
ofIdaho Code Section 45-508. The use of the term "improvement" in Idaho Code Section 45-508 
"does not encompass the improvement of a lot within the meaning of section 504." Hopkins, 151 
Idaho at 746. The materials and labor provided for a golf course improvement fall within Idaho 
Code Section 45-504. ld. 
The Summerwind Development is not located within an incorporated city or town, therefore 
Idaho Code Section 45-504 is inapplicable to Knife River's liens in the case at bar. However, the 
Court's analysis in Hopkins is relevant to the classification of Knife River's improvement as one 
benefitting the land, as opposed to an improvement to a separate structure. If the Summerwind 
Development was aW1exed into the City of Caldwell, Knife River's work would clearly be 
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encompassed by Idaho Code Section 45-504, based on the plain language in the statute and the 
holding in Hopkins. Knife River submits that this analysis is helpful in determining whether Knife 
River's work constitutes an improvement to the land or an improvement to an identifiable structure 
for the purposes of applying Idaho Code Section 45-508, and provides further support for the 
District Court's orders in this case. 
The District Court's reasoning and analysis in its application of Idaho Code Section 45-508 
to Knife River's liens are consistent with this Court's holding in Hopkins. The District Court 
properly concluded that Knife River's work is an improvement to the land, not an improvement to a 
separate, identifiable structure. Consequently, designation under Idaho Code Section 45-508 was 
not required, and IFA is not entitled to subordinate Knife River's liens to its Deed of Trust. 
1. IFA and IGP confuse designation under Idaho Code Section 45-508 with the 
concept of equitable apportionment. 
As an initial matter, the Court in Hopkins held "[a]pportionment of a lien is only required by 
statute if the lien claim falls within the ambit for section 508." Hopkins, 151 Idaho at 748. 
Within their respective arguments to subordinate Knife River's liens for the alleged failure 
to properly designate amounts due for separate improvements, both IF A and IGP interchangeably 
use the terms "apportionment" and "designation." Knife River respectfully submits that whether a 
lien for an improvement to the land may be apportioned amongst multiple lots does not subject the 
lien to subordination under Idaho Code Section 45-508. 
IGP's argument at pages 8:'9 of its brief illustrates the confusion created between 
apportionment among multiple lots and designation under Idaho Code Section 45-508. IGP initially 
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asserts that it is not asking this Court "to find that apportionment or designation on a lot by lot basis 
was required by Knife River." Briee p. 8. IGP, howeveL then urges the Court to subordinate Knife 
River's liens on the grounds that Knife River failed to designate costs incurred for work perfornled 
on different lots within the Summerwind Development, namely the golf course lots. Brief, p. 9. 
IGP's contradictory argument disregards the clear distinction the Court made in Hopkins between 
the designation requirement under Idaho Code Section 45-508 and the concept of equitable 
apportionment, which the Court determined was not an appropriate remedy in that case. Hopkins, 
151 Idaho at 748. 
For the reasons set forth above and in reliance on this Court's holding in Hopkins, Idaho 
Code Section 45-508 did not require Knife River to designate in its liens separate amounts due for 
the costs of paving the dedicated roadways from the costs of paving the golf cart paths. Knife 
River's asphalt paving work is an improvement to the land under Idaho Code Section 45-501, so the 
designation requirements under Idaho Code Section 45-508 simply do not apply to Knife River's 
liens. Consistent with the Court's analysis in Hopkins, the concept of equitable apportionment also 
does not apply to Knife River's liens. 
In Hopkins, the Court ruled that even if the claimant was required to apportion the amounts 
due across mUltiple parcels of property, "apportionment would not be practical ... because there 
was only a single contract governing the project and ... there was never any segregation of the 
billings as to each parcel encumbered by the lien." ld. at 748.5 The Court's discussion of the 
5 The claimant in Hopkins appears to have presented some evidence to the trial court to attempt to raise 
material issues of fact as to the costs attributable to the various lots comprising the golf course lots. Hopkins, 151 
Idaho at 747-48. 
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application of equitable apportionment to a mechanics' lien appears to leave open the possibility 
that a lien may be apportioned, if the apportionment does not diminish the claimant's foreclosure 
rights against the property it has improved. ld 
Similar to the claimant in Hopkins, Knife River performed all of its asphalt paving work in 
the Summerwind Development under a single contract with ELL, although Knife River did 
segregate the cost for most of the billing associated with the golf cart paths in its invoices to ELL. 
R. Vol. VII, pp. 1153-1155. Therefore, it may be possible to attempt to apportion the amount of 
Knife River's liens attributable to the golf course. Equitable apportionment, however, may still not 
be practical because some of the paving work performed by Knife River in August 2007 and 
included in the August 29, 2007 invoice was related to work performed in the roadways, not the 
golf course. R. Vol. III, p. 340; R. Vol. VII, p. 1012 (Daniels Depo., p. 24, 11. 11-21). 
Knife River attempted to equitably apportion its liens when it commenced its foreclosure 
action in 2008 by dividing the costs of its improvement equally into the number of lots in Phases I 
and II of the Summerwind Development. R. Vol. VI, p. 864, ~~ 7-9. Knife River took this action 
prior to the issuance of the Hopkins decision by this Court. While equitable apportionment was not 
required, Knife River's attempt to apportion its liens has no legal effect on the priority of Knife 
River's interests relative to IF A. 
If the Court were to detennine that equitable apportionment of Knife River's liens is 
appropriate, the segregation of Knife River's costs between the golf course lots and the balance of 
the Summerwind Development property is not the same as finding Knife River's liens are 
subordinated to IFA's interests for failing to comply with Idaho Code Section 45-508. 
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F. Idaho Code Section 45-505 does not apply to Knife River's liens. 
Idaho Code Section 45-505 provides: 
The land upon which or in connection with which any professional 
services are perfonned or any building, improvement or structure 
is constructed, together with a convenient space about the same, or 
so much as may be required for the convenient use and occupation 
thereof, to be detennined by the court on rendering judgment, is 
also subject to the lien, if, at the commencement of the furnishing 
of professional services or other work, the furnishing of the 
material, or the renting, leasing or otherwise supplying of 
equipment, materials or fixtures as defined in section 28-12-309, 
Idaho Code, for the same, the land belonged to the person who 
caused said professional services to be performed or said building, 
improvement or structure to be constructed, altered or repaired, or 
such person was acting as the agent of the owner, but if such 
person owns less than a fee simple estate in such land, then only 
the interest of the person or persons causing the services or 
improvement therein is subject to such lien. 
Similar to the application of Idaho Code Section 45-508 requiring designation of amounts due on 
multiple buildings or structures, Idaho Code Section 45-505 only requires the court to detennine the 
property to be sold to satisfy a lien when the land is a "mere incident" to the improvement. Chief 
Industries v. Schwendiman, 99 Idaho 682, 687, 587 P.2d 823, 827 (1978). The statutory restraint of 
Idaho Code Section 45-505 is not applicable "where there was no specific structure erected." 
Weber v. Eastern Idaho Packing Corp., 94 Idaho 694, 698,496 P.2d 693,697 (1972); see a/so, 
Hopkins, 151 Idaho at 745-46 (discussing the limited application ofldaho Code Section 45-505 to 
liens arising under Idaho Code Section 45-501 for work performed on a building, wherein only an 
incidental lien is obtained upon the land pursuant to Section 505). 
Knife River's liens are not subject to Idaho Code Section 45-505 on the grounds that its 
liens are for constructing an improvement to the land under Idaho Code Section 45-501. 
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A lien claimant may perfect a lien against property even for the cost of work actually 
performed on an adjoining parcel, if the work benefits the parcel being foreclosed. Fairfax v. 
Ramirez, 133 Idaho 72, 77, 982 P.2d 375, 380 (CL App. 1999). In fairfax, the Court of Appeals 
permitted the lien claimant to include the costs incurred for improving a roadway easement to its 
claim against separate property upon which the claimant also performed work. Id at 77-78; see 
also Chamberlain v. City of Lewiston, 23 Idaho 254, 129 P. 1069 (1912) (wherein the Court found 
the claimant's lien attached to a waterworks system in spite of the fact that the work completed was 
not done on the system itself). 
If the Court finds that Idaho Code Section 45-505 applies to Knife River's liens, the Court 
should rule as a matter of law that all of the lots within the Summerwind Development, including 
the golf course lots, benefit from Knife River's asphalt paving. The infrastructure work Knife River 
performed in 2006 and 2007 benefitted the overall development of the property as a residential 
subdivision and golf course. The recorded plats depict the future building lots and golf course lots, 
and the work on both aspects of the project was taking place simultaneously throughout 2007. It is 
also noteworthy that the dedicated roadways paved by Knife River provide the only access to the 
golf course. R. Vol. III, pp. 420-28, 432-441. Simply put, IGP and the patrons who play golf at 
Timber Stone Golf Course are all utilizing Knife River's improvement as access. Consistent with 
the holding in Fairfax, Knife River should be entitled to recover its costs for the asphalt paving of 
both the roadways and the cart paths to satisfy its liens against the golf course lots because the 
roadways directly benefit those lots. 
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lGP argues that Knife River should be limited to only foreclose nine of the eighteen holes of 
the finished golf course. This argument ignores the use of the property as a fully functioning 
eighteen-hole golf course. In Hopkins, the Court determined that the use of the subject lots as a golf 
course and practice range amounted to a single improvement. Hopkins, 151 Idaho at 747. With 
regard to the golf course at issue in the present case, IGP is requesting that the Court divide the 
holes on the actual golf course itself when determining the amount of land Knife River should be 
entitled to foreclose to satisfy its lien. Consistent with the holdings in Hopkins and Fairfax, Knife 
River should be allowed to proceed with the sale of the entire golf course to satisfy its liens. 
Idaho Code Section 45-505 does not apply to Knife River's liens because Knife River's 
infrastmcture work is an improvement to the land, and Section 45-505 only requires the Court to 
determine the amount of land subject to a lien when the lien attaches to a building or stmcture. 
Alternatively, based on the record in this case, the Court should find Knife River is entitled to 
recover the full cost of its improvement from the golf course lots on the grounds that these lots 
benefit from the use of paved roadways to access the golf course. 
The District Court properly applied the law established in both Hopkins and Fairfax when it 
entered its Order on Motion for Entry of ludgment. R. Vol. IX, p. 1534. The arguments presented 
by IF A and IGP in this appeal do not justify reversal of the District Court's Order or necessitate 
remanding the case for the presentation of evidence relating to the property benefitting from Knife 
River's work. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Knife River respectfully requests the COUl1 affim1 the District Court's orders granting 
summary judgment in favor of Knife River, and allow Knife River to proceed with foreclosure 
against the subject property consistent with the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure entered in this 
case. Knife River also respectfully requests an award of costs incurred relating to this appeal, 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Appellate Procedure 40(a) and Idaho Code Section 12-101. 
DATED this 30th day of January, 2014. 
FISHER, PUSCH & KRUECK, LLP 
By: 
David T. Kmeck 
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